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Synopsis
China’s rise to prosperity has seen increased tension with international standards of human rights and the rule 
of law such that, after a lengthy period of tentative engagement China has more recently worked to change 
international standards to accommodate its interests. China’s approach to human rights and the rule of law has 
significant implications for Canada, not only for our bilateral relations but also in terms of the impacts on 
international institutions that are of vital interest to Canada. In response, Canada should pursue a program of 
selective engagement, that combines attention to China’s abuses of human rights and the rule of law with 
continuing engagement on issues of bilateral and global concern.
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  Indeed, the PRC Supreme People’s Court itself was 
chastised earlier this year for unsatisfactory 
“implementation of the Party’s line, direction, and policies 
and the Party’s central decision making and deployment.”6  
Lawyers too are subject to Party control under the PRC 
Lawyers Law and the All-China Lawyers Association’s 
“Lawyers Code of Conduct.”7  Under Xi Jinping, the 
precept of Party Supremacy has been entrenched more 
insistently in PRC legal institutions where human rights 
are most often advanced and decided.8  Party dominance 
over human rights was explained in China’s 2019 human 
rights White Paper, which averred, “the Party’s leadership 
is the fundamental guarantee for the people of China to 
have access to human rights, and to fully enjoy more 
human rights.”9 
Supporting the precept of Party Supremacy, China’s 
human rights orthodoxy holds that all rights remain 
conditional on loyalty to the Party-state. The PRC 
constitution provides “every citizen enjoys the rights and 
at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by 
the Constitution and the law” and that the exercise of 
constitutional rights “may not infringe upon the interests 
of the state, of society or of the collective, or upon the 
lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.”10 Thus, 
constitutional rights in freedoms of expression, the press, 
assembly and association, demonstration, religious belief, 
and more  depend on submission to the authority of the 
Party-state. The orthodoxy of Regime-Led Development 
also relies on a precept that maintaining stability is 
fundamental to PRC law and governance.11 China’s 
various human rights white papers and action plans hold 
consistently that stability is essential for China’s 
development and hence is an essential objective of China’s 
law and practice on human rights and the rule of law.12  
3
China’s respect for human rights and the rule of law is 
indispensable from a constructive diplomatic relationship 
with Canada because it affects a wide range of Canada-
China bilateral diplomatic, commercial, and socio-cultural 
interactions. As a middle power, Canada has a significant 
stake in international institutions and standards whose 
effectiveness depends on China’s commitment to human 
rights.
PRC Approaches to Human Rights and Rule of Law
The People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) holds to a human 
rights orthodoxy of Regime-Led Development1.  Consistent 
with earlier official statements dating back to the 1989 
Tiananmen Crisis, China’s 2019 human rights white paper 
held: 
“The rights to subsistence and development are the 
primary rights ... The effective guarantee of the right to 
subsistence and the steady improvement of living standards 
are the preconditions and foundations for fulfilling and 
developing all other human rights.” 2 
The orthodoxy of Regime-Led Development is bolstered in 
turn by precepts requiring the supremacy of the ruling 
Communist Party of China (“CPC”), the conditionality of 
rights, and the developmental stability. First, the CPC 
exercises unfettered control over all institutions and 
processes of PRC governance.3  CPC control extends to 
China’s “socialist legal system,” which uses legal 
terminology to articulate and enforce the orders of the 
Party-state.4  
Despite efforts under SPC President Xiao Yang (1998–
2008) to strengthen their professionalism and autonomy, 
judges remain subject to ever-stricter CPC oversight.5 
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1  See Pitman B. Potter, Exporting Virtue? China’s International Human Rights Activism in the Age of Xi Jinping (Vancouver: forthcoming UBC Press, 2020), from which parts of this essay are adapted.
2 State Council Information Office (“SCIO”), “Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China,” http://english.scio.gov.cn/node_8014390.html, Section II. Also see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s  Republic of China (“MFA”), “China and the United Nations: Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China for the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 18, 2019,  
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1698812.shtml, Section VIII, which sums up China’s human rights philosophy as “giving top priority to development.”
3 See generally Stein Ringen, The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century (Hong Kong: HKU Press, 2016).
4 Rogier Creemers, “Party Ideology and Chinese Law,” SSRN, July 9, 2018, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210541; Susan Trevaskes, “China’s Party-Led Rule-of-Law Regime,” East Asia Forum, October 2, 2017, http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/02/chinas-party-led-rule-of-law-regime/. 
5 “Regulation on the Communist Party of China’s Political-Legal Work,” China Law Translate, January 18, 2019, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/regulation-on-the-communist-party-of-chinas-political-legal-work/.
6 “Central Inspection Group Gives Feedback to the Supreme People’s Court (2020 edition),” Supreme People’s Court Monitor, January 12, 2020, https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2020/01/12/central-inspection- 
group-gives-feedback-to-the-supreme-peoples-court-2020-edition/. 
7 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lüshi fa” [Lawyers Law of the PRC], rev. October 28, 2007, Article 3, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/prc-lawyers-law-2007-revision-chinese-text; “Lawyers Practice Code 
of Conduct (Draft Revisions),” China Law Translate, June 18, 2014, http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/lawyers-practice-code-of-conduct-draft-revisions/?lang=en.
8 Chen Yujie, 2019 Nian Sifa Renquan Guancha [Survey on human rights in the (PRC) administration of Justice], Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, http://www.tfd.org.tw/opencms/chinese/publication/human/.
SCIO, “Seeking Happiness for People,” Section I.
9 “Constitution of the PRC,” rev. 2004, Articles 33, 51, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/constitution-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.
10 Sarah Biddulph, The Stability Imperative: Human Rights and Law in China (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016). 
SCIO, “Seeking Happiness for People,” Section I.
11 “Constitution of the PRC,” rev. 2004, Articles 33, 51, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/constitution-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china. Sarah Biddulph, The Stability Imperative: Human Rights and Law in 
China (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016). 
12 SCIO, “National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012–2015)”; SCIO, “Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2014,” Section III; SCIO, “New Progress in the Judicial Protection of Human Rights in China,” September
 12, 2016, Section III; SCIO, “New Progress in the Legal Protection of Human Rights in China,” December 15, 2017, Section V; http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1613604/1613604.htm; http:// 
www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7241418.htm; “Rule of Law Strengthens Social Stability in New Era: Editorial,” China Daily, March 12, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/12/
WS5c87a4faa3106c65c34ee3b0.html.
China has also worked to challenge international 
standards on the rule of law. Despite direct conflicts with 
the consensus norms of the UN Delivering Justice 
Programme that the rule of law should apply equally to 
both government and society,20 China has defended its 
CPC-dominated legal system as a legitimate alternative. 
For example, China’s 2016 UN position paper claimed, “at 
the national level, countries are entitled to independently 
choose the mode of rule of law that suits their national 
conditions.”21 China’s 2019 position paper reiterated that 
the rule of law should be subject to China’s specific 
national conditions.22  Thus, like its efforts with 
international human rights rules, Xi Jinping’s China has 
attempted to insulate its authoritarian legal regime from 
the reach of international standards on rule of law - either 
by claiming exceptionalism or by seeking to change the 
standards themselves.
Implications for Canada
Canada has enjoyed a long and mutually beneficial 
relationship with China. From the earliest days of the 
Pacific Princess delivering mail in 1889, to the opening of 
Sun Life’s China office 1893 and the establishment of the 
Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce office in 
Shanghai in 1909, Canada has pursued commercial 
opportunities with counterparts in China for well over a 
century. In the early and middle years of the 20th century, 
missionary-led education efforts in China, and 
immigration and head tax reforms in Canada, laid a 
foundation for people-to-people exchanges. The all-
important wheat sales beginning in 1961, alleviated 
China’s post–Great Leap Forward famine and signalled 
Canada’s commitment to compassionate development 
aid. Formal diplomatic relations beginning in 1970 laid 
the foundation for the removal of Cold War barriers and 
the re-entry of the PRC into the world
4
In light of China’s human rights orthodoxy and its 
attendant precepts, few find it surprising that China’s 
record on human rights and the rule of law leaves much to 
be desired. Abuses in Xi Jinping’s China have been well 
documented in areas such as censorship, the torture of 
prisoners, extensive use of the death penalty, suppression 
of religious freedoms, abuse of ethnic minorities (including 
but not limited to the incarceration of some 1.5 million of 
Xinjiang’s Uighur Muslims and some half million Tibetans 
in forced labour camps”13), denial of LGBTQ rights, use of 
surveillance technology, and the persecution of Chinese 
lawyers and legal scholars to name a few14.  Such abuses 
present a challenge for Canada’s bilateral relations with 
China. 
China’s International Activism
China has worked assiduously to insulate its preferred 
approach to human rights and the rule of law from the 
reach of international standards while also working to 
revise those standards to suit PRC orthodoxy.15 For many 
years, China’s approach to international human rights 
standards followed a well-worn path of tentative 
acceptance coupled with references to local conditions as 
grounds for delays in implementation. While China 
remains bound by numerous international human rights 
treaties it has either signed or ratified,16  in recent years the 
Xi regime has endeavored more intently to amend 
international standards to conform to its own 
preferences.17  Through its membership on the UN Human 
Rights Council (“UNHRC”), China has worked to entrench 
its human rights orthodoxy as an alternative to exiting 
rules.18  China’s response to the 2018 UNHRC Universal 
Periodic Review (“UPR”) asserted the validity of human 
rights with Chinese characteristics,  underscoring yet 
further Beijing’s resistance to international standards. 
13 Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,” backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, November 25, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-crackdown-uighurs-xinjiang; Helen Davidson, 
“Report charts China’s expansion of mass labour programme in Tibet,” The Guardian, September 22, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/22/report-charts-chinas-expansion-of-mass-labour- 
programme-in-tibet. 
14 Congressional-Executive Commission on China (“CECC”), 2019 Annual Report (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 2019), https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-
reports/2019-annual-report; Human Rights Watch (“HRW”), “China: Events of 2019,” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/china-and-tibet.
15 HRW, “China’s Global Threat to Human Rights,” 2019, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global.  
16 University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, “Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties – China,” http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-china.html. For example, China has ratified or 
acceded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”), the convention against slavery, and the anti-torture convention. China has not ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), but as a signatory is bound under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1155 UNTS 331, entered into force January 27, 1980, https://
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf) “to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of the covenant pending ratification.
17 Yu-jie Chen, “China’s Challenge to the International Human Rights Regime,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 51 (2019), pp. 1179–1222, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3308205.
18 Sonya Sceats and Shaun Breslin, “China and the International Human Rights System,” Chatham House, October 1, 2012, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/186781. 
19 UNHRC, “National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: China,” October 1, 2018, A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/1*, Section I.C, https://www.upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/document/china/session_31_-_november_2018/a_hrc_wg.6_31_chn_1_e.pdf.
20 UNGA, “Delivering Justice: Programme of Action to Strengthen the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels: Report of the Secretary-General,” March 16, 2012, A/66/749, http://archive.ipu.org/splz-e/
unbrief12/sg-report.pdf.
21 MFA, “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China at the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 7, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1395489.shtml. 
22 MFA, “China and the United Nations: Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China for the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 18, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1698812.shtml, Section VIII.
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refugees (particularly from Hong Kong after China’s 
recent enactment of a draconian and far-reaching security 
law). Perhaps most importantly, Canadians with family 
members in China suffer from the denial of human rights 
to their loved ones. 
Multilaterally, China’s efforts to undermine universal 
standards for human rights and the rule of law challenge 
Canada’s efforts to promote a rules-based international 
order.24 Predictable and enforceable standards are 
essential to international relations – especially when there 
is disagreement (as there often is) over the 
implementation and global impacts of particular policy 
decisions and initiatives. China’s refusal to accept the 
award of the international South China Sea arbitration, its 
resistance to international environmental and labour 
standards, and its continued detention and forced labour 
of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang are but a few examples of 
China’s disregard for international  human rights 
standards and the rule of law.25  Such disregard informs 
PRC conditions for participation in multilateral 
initiatives. The content and operation of international 
efforts on peace keeping, sustainable development, and 
global governance depend increasingly on their 
compatibility with China’s preferences on human rights 
and rule of law.26  While buy-in from individual states is 
generally part and parcel of multilateral programs, 
China’s political clout and economic weight militate 
against the success of international initiatives deemed 
inconsistent with PRC orthodoxy on human rights and 
the rule of law. 
Bilaterally, the Meng Wanzhou matter revealed the costs 
China’s disregard for human rights have on Canada.27  
Even while raising human rights concerns over Canada’s 
arrest in December 2018 of the Huawei executive 
following an extradition treaty request from the United 
5
political economy. Human rights and the rule of law have 
played an important role in each of these efforts, 
influencing program objectives and operational terms for 
commercial links, community ties, development aid, and 
diplomatic relations.
Aside from its significance for the lives and wellbeing of the 
Chinese people, the PRC’s approach to human rights and 
the rule of law has important implications for Canada 
today. Recalling that human rights and the rule of law 
affect not only political discourse but virtually all aspects of 
socio-economic life, ranging from trade and investment to 
business regulation, environmental protection, labour 
relations, immigration and travel, public health, housing, 
and many others, China’s performance has widespread 
impacts for Canadians with activities and interests there. 
China’s disregard of international legal standards on 
human rights and the rule of law undercuts the activities of 
Canadian businesses, media organizations, and NGOs in 
China on a wide array of issues involving contract and 
property rights (including discrimination against foreign 
firms, intellectual property theft, and corruption), 
personnel (including limits on the hiring of international 
and local staff), operations (including inconsistent 
licensing and approvals), travel (especially restrictions on 
travel to minority areas, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan), 
and communications (notably internet restrictions and 
surveillance).23 As well, Canadian government initiatives 
and activities are constrained by uncertainties over China’s 
performance of treaty standards on consular relations 
(particularly regarding  support for Canadians detained in 
China), immigration and nationality controls (notably 
concerning China’s treatment of Canadians who renounce 
their PRC citizenship), surveillance and security 
(particularly regarding protection of Canadians with 
personal, professional, and academic ties to China), and 
23 See e.g., Global Affairs Canada, “Travel Advisories – China,” August 28, 2020, https://travel.gc.ca/destinations/china/.
24 Global Affairs Canada, “Plans at a glance and operating context,” June 6, 2019, https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/priorities-priorites.aspx?lang=eng.
25 Full Text of Statement of China’s Foreign Ministry on Award of South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Philippines,” China Daily, July 12, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016scsi/2016-07/12/
content_26062029.htm; Bo Zhang and Cong Cao, “Policy: Four Gaps in China’s New Environmental Law,” Nature, January 21, 2015, http://www.nature.com/news/policy-four-gaps-in-china-s-new- 
 environmental-law-1.16736; China-Country Baselines under the ILO Declaration (2000-2018), July 22, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/countrybaselines/WCMS_751606/lang--
en/index.htm; “Canada among Countries Urging China to Shut Uighur Detention Camps,” CBC News, November 6, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-uighur-detention-camps-canada-western-
 countries-1.4893676.
26 Christine Lee, “It’s Not Just the WHO: How China is Moving on the Whole U.N.,” Politico, April 15, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/15/its-not-just-the-who-how-china-is-moving-on-the-whole-
un-189029; Deborah Lehr, “Is China Still the Global Leader on Climate Change?,” The Diplomat, October 21, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/is-china-still-the-global-leader-on-climate-change/. 
27 Canadian Press, “A timeline of events in the case of Meng Wanzhou,” National Post, June 19, 2020; “Huawei Arrest: What’s Happening between Canada and China?,” CBC News, January 29, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca
/news/world/huawei-meng-timeline-1.4989139. 
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climate change, pandemic responses, and bilateral issues 
such as disability rights, sustainable design, narcotics 
control, and money laundering.33 Discarding the 
suggestion that raising concerns about human rights and 
the rule of law will simply anger China and lead to 
unproductive outcomes, selective engagement would 
enable Canada to challenge China’s abuses through 
international, regional, and local institutions and 
communities even while pursuing cooperation on specific 
bilateral and multilateral initiatives. And rather than 
giving in to the temptation to see China as hopelessly 
incalcitrant and incapable of responsible conduct barring 
significant regime reform – even regime change,34 
selective engagement would encourage cooperation with 
the PRC Party-state on issues of mutual concern while 
also promoting collaboration with like-minded actors in 
China and elsewhere to counter abuse of international 
human-rights and rule-of-law standards. 
Selective engagement offers a useful alternative to 
relational discourses that either subordinate frank 
discussion on China’s abuses of human rights and rule of 
law to the broad imperative of maintaining friendly 
relations or else reject the possibility of positive relations 
altogether. Canada should reserve its relational 
commitments for friends and allies who share our 
commitment to human rights and the rule of law, whereas 
for China a situational approach seems more sensible. 
Canada would be well served by cooperating with a range 
of global, regional, and local actors to encourage 
performance of existing international human-rights and 
rule-of-law standards, resist China’s revisionist efforts, 
and hold China accountable for derogation while also 
building on opportunities for agreement and cooperation 
on global and bilateral issues of mutual interest. The 
government of Canada has a special responsibility in this 
regard since individual firms and organizations, while 
6
States, China’s behavior confirmed its narrow commitment 
to the rule of law. Whereas in Canada, Meng has had full 
access to PRC consular officials and was released on bail 
after a public judicial hearing at which she was represented 
by counsel, in China Canadians Michael Kovrig and 
Michael Spavor were detained on vague national security 
grounds without meaningful access to Canadian consular 
officials or legal counsel and were subjected to harsh 
treatment, all in defiance of bilateral agreements and 
international human rights treaties. China’s decision to cut 
off imports of canola to encourage Canada to “correct the 
mistakes it made earlier” signalled disregard for the 
international trade law in furtherance of Beijing’s political 
goals.28  Indeed, concern over China’s efforts to 
subordinate trade relations to its political agendas despite 
WTO standards to the contrary, seems to have contributed 
to Canada’s decision to discontinue  talks over a possible 
free trade agreement.29 
Ways Forward
Setting aside PRC efforts to enlist local commentators to 
advance PRC policy preferences,30 Canadian responses to 
China’s parochialism on human rights and the rule of law 
tend to vary along a spectrum of alternatives. At one end, is 
an accommodationist position that suggests that China is 
large, powerful, and essential to Canada and that the best 
approach is simply to avoid antagonizing China despite its 
problems.31 At the other end, are activist critics, often with 
direct experience of China’s human rights abuses, who are 
less willing to accommodate China until it mends its 
ways.32 A viable middle-ground alternative would rely on 
the time-honoured strategic option of “selective 
engagement” to enable focused challenges to China’s 
abuses of human rights and the rule of law even while 
pursuing cooperation on matters of mutual interest such as 
global initiatives on  
28 Associated Press, “China Urges Canada to ‘Correct the Mistakes It Made Earlier’ as Canola Spat Deepens,” CBC News, March 27, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-canola-crackdown-1.5073234?
fbclid=IwAR1lxycKg1qvSJ8zpu8tfG5WKm8COeHtA7y__dI-DCRof4V5sCXV8wiDn5A. 
29 Nathan Vanderklippe, “Canada abandons free-trade talks with China in shift for Trudeau government,” The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2020, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-canada-abandons-free-
trade-talks-with-china-in-shift-for-trudeau/.
30 Robert Fife and Stephen Chase, “Inside Huawei’s campaign to influence Canadian public opinion,” The Globe and Mail, September 16, 2020, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-inside-huaweis-campaign-
to-influence-canadian-public-opinion/.
31 Stephen Chase and Robert Fife, “More than 100 ex-diplomats urge Trudeau to swap Meng for Kovrig and Spavor, The Globe and Mail, September 18, 2020, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-more-
than-100-ex-diplomats-urge-trudeau-to-swap-meng-for-kovrig-and/; John Paul Tasker and Brennan MacDonald, “Former parliamentarians, diplomats pen letter calling on Canada to release Meng,” CBC 
News, June 24, 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/letter-release-meng-1.5625669.
32 Rupa Shenoy, “Canadian activists say they’re being targeted by China,” The World, May 19, 2020, https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-05-19/canadian-activists-say-they-re-being-targeted-china; Amnesty International, 
“Human rights defenders increasingly face threats intimidation over China advocacy: report,” March 2020.
33 “Canada Must Toughen Stance With China, Ex-Diplomats Say,” US News and World Report, June 23, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2020-06-23/canadas-trudeau-must-toughen-stance-with- 
china-ex-diplomats-say.
34 Gordon G. Chang, “Mike Pompeo Just Declared America’s New China Policy: Regine Change,” The National Interest, July 25, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/mike-pompeo-just-declared-america’s-new-china-
policy-regime-change-165639.
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positive engagement on issues of mutual interest with 
critical engagement on human rights and the rule of law. 
At the core this approach is a recognition that, 
suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, China needs 
the support of Canada and the international community 
to fulfill its goals of development and prosperity. The 
general transition in PRC foreign policy from pursuit of 
ideological ambition toward interest-based pragmatism 
permits China to pursue matters of mutual concern with 
Canada even while being called to task for human-rights 
and rule-of-law abuses. Indeed, China’s efforts to alter 
international human-rights and rule-of-law standards 
tend to confirm its need for international approval – an 
isolationist China would hardly be expected to devote 
such efforts to changing the terms of international norms 
and institutions. Commercially, Chinese firms do 
business with Canada not because of an abstract fondness 
for the land of Norman Bethune, but because it is in their 
interest to do so. Despite the increased role of PRC state-
owned and state-run enterprises, interest-based 
commercial decision-making by Chinese firms seems 
unlikely to be swayed much by Beijing’s political goals.
Despite Beijing’s posturing to the contrary, Canada would 
do well to conduct its China relations from a position of 
confidence – in our value to China as a trade partner and 
an emblem of international legitimacy and acceptance, in 
the value of our commitment to human rights and rule of 
law for Canada’s influence in China and globally, and in 
China’s pragmatic willingness to seek agreement on 
matters of mutual interest despite criticism of its practices 
on human rights and the rule of law. As we celebrate fifty 
years of formal diplomatic ties, Canada has an 
opportunity to enrich our association with China through 
selective engagement on human rights and the rule of law. 
The importance of the Canada-China relationship 
requires no less.
7
already attaching to their program and budgeting 
considerations a “China premium” reflecting the costs of 
China’s disregard for international standards on human 
rights and the rule of law, are otherwise unable to address 
these issues directly due to China’s political influence and 
economic weight. 
Mindful of the perception that inaction in the face of 
abuses of international human-rights and rule-of-law 
standards connotes complicity, Canada can pursue a 
number of useful steps in response to PRC behaviour. 
Canada should work through the UN Development 
Programme (“UNDP”), the Organization for Economic 
Development and Cooperation (“OECD”), and the G20 
while also supporting private diplomacy through Track 
Two initiatives to encourage China to affirm the 
importance of existing international human-rights and 
rule-of-law standards and promote their enforcement. As 
well, Canada should continue to pursue cooperation with 
human-rights advocates internationally and within China 
to encourage performance of international standards. 
Canada should support inclusion of independent NGO 
audits of China’s performance on human rights and rule of 
law in the formal reporting by the UNHRC’s Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) processes as a foundation for 
holding China accountable for violations of international 
standards. Finally, measured application of Magnitsky 
sanctions against PRC officials and business executives 
responsible for or complicit in gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights would be 
appropriate in response to local abuses. Such measures 
need not undermine but rather should complement 
continuing efforts to cooperate with China on matters of 
mutual concern. Just as global business communities 
increasingly recognize that improving China’s performance 
of international human-rights and rule-of-law standards is 
good for business, so too have policy actors in China 
recognized that China’s performance of those standards is 
important for the PRC’s expanding global influence. 
Selective engagement would enable Canada to combine 
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